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Ethics and Economics (E&E): - “Academic philosophers often oppose your position on 
global justice to Singer’s preference satisfaction view on the one hand and to Sen 
and Nussbaum’s capability approach on the other (both Singer and Nussbaum have 
interviewed for Ethics and Economics). To what extent would you say that your 
disagreements with their positions are reflected in the practical conclusions you 
draw concerning the reduction of world poverty?” 
 
Thomas Pogge (T.P.): - “Our practical conclusions diverge considerably in what we 
emphasize. Singer focuses most on aid effort affluent people can undertake or 
support as individuals. I focus most on structural reforms that would not channel 
money to the global poor but would lift from them burdens that we currently impose 
on them for our benefit: we must reduce, revise, or remove protectionist barriers, 
structural adjustment programs, rents for use of our ‘intellectual property’, and the 
international resource, borrowing, treaty, and arms priviledges. (To explain these 
priviledges: under existing international rules, we in effect authorize any person or 
group holding effective power in a country – regardless of how they acquired or 
exercise it – to sell the country’s resources and to dispose of the proceeds of such 
sales, to borrow in the country’s name and thereby to impose debt service obligations 
upon it, to sign treaties on the country’s behalf and thus to bind its present and future 
population, and to use state revenues to buy the means of internal repression.) Sen 
emphasizes reforms of social institutions and policies in the poorer countries 
themselves. However, these differences in practical conclusions are orthogonal to the 
differences in our moral positions. 
 
                                            
∗ A short biography of Pr. Pogge follows the interview. 
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The principled moral differences are, first, that I emphasize negative duties while 
Singer focuses on positive duties and Sen/Nussbaum do not highlight the distinction. 
I see this as a nice complementarity, not as a disagreement. But it does have this 
consequence: I am especially concerned with people whose lives are blighted as a 
result of unjust social institutions in whose design or imposition I and my readers 
participate. Other people may be just as badly off – on account of an accident or 
genetic defect, for example. Of course we ought to help the latter. But on my view, 
our obligations to the former are of greater weight. Other things (namely, what is at 
stake for all involved) being equal, our duties not to harm are more stringent than our 
duties to aid.” 
 
E&E: - “Could you please explain the distinction you use between positive and negative 
duties, and how you use this distinction in your work on global justice?” 
 
T.P.: - “Thinking about justice is often divided into two domains: international and intra-
national. In the first domain, people think in interactional terms about the rules that 
states ought to obey in their conduct. In the second domain, the question is to what 
extent the rules according to which each state is organized are producing certain 
harms or benefits for the population. This institutional analysis, which is 
commonplace intra-nationally, is one that I want to carry to the global level. 
 
The global economic order as we now have it consists of a very large set of rules. By 
analyzing severe poverty and premature deaths both institutionally and on the global 
level, we can trace back their overall incidence to the relevant institutional rules, 
such as the evolving system of amazingly detailed treaties and conventions 
structuring the world economy, regulation trade (WTO), investments, loans, patents, 
copyrights, trademark, double taxation, labor standards, environmental protection 
and much else. Responsibilities for these rules and their foreseeable effects lie 
primarily with the governments of the more powerful countries which, in 
international negotiation, enjoy a huge advantage in bargaining power and expertise. 
Their negotiators have succeeded, again and again, in shaping the rules in the interest 
of the governments, corporations and citizens of the rich countries. In many cases, 
rules so shaped foreseeably inflict great harm upon the global poor – harms that one 
can estimate at least in general statistical terms.  Seeing that our wealthy countries 
are at least approximately democratic, we citizens, certainly share responsibility for 
the rules our governments negotiate in our names and for the human cost these rules 
impose around the world. But there are also less obvious rules that have a 
tremendous negative effect on living conditions in the poor countries. Take the 
international resource and borrowing privileges, which allow any person or group 
holding effective power in a developing country to sell the resources of the country 
or to borrow in its name, irrespective of whether that person or group has any kind of 
democratic legitimacy. (I skip here two further, complementary privileges related to 
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arms and treaties: any person or group holding effective power in a developing 
country is recognized as entitled to purchase weapons – most often used for domestic 
repression – and is entitled to sign treaties in the name of the whole countries). These 
privileges are very convenient for the rich countries who can buy resources from 
anybody who happens to exercise effective power in a country. However, they are 
devastating for the populations of the developing countries, in particular in Africa. 
This is an example of how the international order, largely upheld by the rich 
countries, aggravates oppression and poverty in the poor countries. Therefore, we 
should not only think about how states ought to behave in their interactions with one 
another. We should also consider the framework of global rules and what effects this 
framework has on phenomena such as poverty.  
 
Now, there is a very old and conventional distinction in moral philosophy between 
positive and negative duties. When the conduct of one person is causally related to 
the fate of another person, then philosophers distinguish between two different ways 
in which that relation might exist. In the first case, a person actively does something 
that causes harm to another person. In the second case a person merely fails to do 
something he could have done to prevent something bad form happening to the other 
person. For example, you might throw a baby into the water and as consequence the 
baby drowns, or you might fail to rescue a baby already in the water with the result 
that this baby dies. Philosophers believe that this distinction between the negative 
duty not to harm and the positive duty to help is morally significant.  In the context 
of understanding what human rights are it is a very important distinction. In my 
view, somebody is a human rights violator only when he or she actively harms others 
or contributes to harming them. Human rights, this very minimal notion of what 
human beings owe one another, do not require that people benefit or rescue or protect 
each other. They merely require that we do not harm others. However, with regard to 
poverty, even this very minimal demand is arguably widely unfulfilled today, since 
the rich countries and their citizens collectively harm many in the poor countries 
through the global economic order they impose.” 
 
E&E: - “Your distinction between positive and negative duties might be traced back to 
Cicero’s interpretation of the Stoics (in On Duties). But Cicero, and the Stoics, seem 
to emphasize the importance of the duty to prevent harm as well as the duty not to 
harm. Is your emphasis on negative duties, i.e. the duty not to harm, perhaps a 
pragmatic one, rising from the belief that most severe poverty is the direct result of 
rules imposed by rich countries? If we succeeded in changing the economic structure 
of the world such that rich countries no longer harmed poor countries, would we no 
longer have a duty to aid each other? Or in cases where harm is not a result of 
international policies, do we have a duty to aid? For example, when New Orleans 
was struck by a natural disaster, various charities, including the hungersite.com, 
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made international appeals for help. Do you feel that their appeal was in any way 
legitimate, or rather, that citizens of the world had no duty to respond?” 
 
T.P.: - “Yes, this emphasis is in part pragmatic. I do believe that most severe suffering in this 
world would be avoided if the rich countries merely fulfilled their duty not to harm. I 
also find, especially in the Anglophone countries, a great reluctance to take positive 
duties seriously. And this is most of my audience, an extremely powerful 
constituency in this world! I say to them: “I know what you expect from a lecture or 
essay about global poverty: an appeal to be more generous, to give more aid. But you 
will not get this from me. I am leaving positive duties aside and rest my case entirely 
on negative duties…” 
 
Many have criticized me for rejecting positive duties. Such criticisms are simply 
mistaken. By taking positive duties off the table in conversation with some particular 
audience, I am not denying such duties in anyway. I am simply leaving them aside 
because I expect that no agreement can be reached. Of course I believe in positive 
duties. But I keep them out of much of my work to make it very clear that I need not 
appeal to them. I want to reach people Peter Singer cannot reach; and those people 
will tune out as soon as I talk about positive duties. 
 
One more thing. Your New Orleans example is flawed in an interesting way. Yes, 
New Orleans was hit by a disastrous storm (Katrina). But the city was flooded 
because the levies were insufficient and had been known to be so for a long time. 
The great harm people suffered was caused by a confluence of natural and social 
factors. And I would then have formulated the appeal — certainly to compatriots — 
differently. Not: “Dear fellow citizens, please help us, we were hit by a storm.” But 
rather: “Dear fellow citizens, due to a grotesquely unjust allocation of infrastructure 
spending by the federal and state governments, favoring white over black, affluent 
over poor, and Republican over Democrat neighborhoods, we have been exposed to a 
substantial risk of devastating flood. This flood has now come to pass, and the 
damage it does is your responsibility. You must now do what you can to minimize 
the harm you will have caused.” 
 
E&E: - “Is your emphasis on negative rather than positive duties in any way motivated by the 
question of how duties might be enforced, i.e. do you think that there is a better 
chance of enforcing negative duties? If so which forms of enforcement are 
acceptable, both on the part of governments and on the part of individuals?” 
 
T.P.: - “I do think that negative duties correlative to human rights are in principle enforceable. 
But this does not motivate my emphasis. I believe that, in this context, any use of 
force by individuals is highly conter-productive. We must patiently convince the 
citizens of the more affluent countries that they must end their crime against 
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humanity. Violence makes it all too easy for them to close their ears, as we have 
witnessed in the aftermath of 9/11. If these citizens agree to institutional 
arrangements more protective of the global poor, then these arrangements may of 
course be enforced by governments in the usual way. For example, the governments 
of the EU may (and should) enforce regulations and taxes designed to protect the 
poor abroad from the effects of present and past injustice.” 
 
E&E: - “Many of the solutions you propose for relieving world poverty are at government 
level. How does this translate in terms of citizens’ responsibilities? Does our 
responsibility end with a rational vote, or should we also lobby governments and 
multinational corporations in order to influence their policies?” 
 
T.P.: - “Our responsibility as citizens is two-fold: (1) We should organize, with others, for 
reforms of our governments’ policies and negotiating position in international fora. 
This extends far beyond voting, which often gives us a meaningless choice once 
every four years. To change things in politics, we must seek to influence the political 
agenda. (2) We should work to protect the global poor from part of the harm we also 
cooperate in imposing on them.  
 
In both these respects together, we should – as a matter of negative duty – do about 
as much as would be necessary, if others similarly placed did as we do, to 
compensate for the harm we together do. Whether to focus more on reform or on 
harm prevention, and which efforts exactly to undertake – this cannot be said 
generally. Each of us should consider his or her situation, endowments and abilities, 
motivational constraints, activities of like-minded people around us, and so on, and 
should then decide on this basis what effort would make most sense in terms of cost 
effectiveness.” 
 
E&E: - “Other than governments and particulars, responsibility for dealing with global 
poverty falls to international organizations such as the United Nations, the World 
Bank, and IMF. How do you perceive the role, influence and limitations of these 
organizations?” 
 
T.P.: - “Of course the UN, World Bank, IMF should work to reduce poverty. But for now 
these organizations are counter-productive by creating the false public appearance of 
concern and commitment. The UN, for example, has managed to dilute the grand 
goal of “reducing the number of under-nourished people to half their present level no 
later than 2015” (World Food Summit, Rome, 1996) to the rather less ambitious goal 
to reduce the number of extremely poor people by 19 percent in the same nineteen 
year period (First Millenium Development Goal, calling for a fify percent reduction, 
between 1990 and 2015, in the proportion of extremely poor people understood as 
their percentage of the total population of the developing countries). And the World 
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Bank has practiced a poverty measurement methodology so severely lacking in 
internal robustness and reliability that we still have no clear idea about the level, 
geographical distribution, and trend of severe poverty worldwide.  
 
Because the practices of these intergovernmental organizations do not change in 
response to arguments, they need to be changed politically. Citizens of the wealthier 
countries are best positioned to do this by exerting pressure on their governments, 
which, together, shape the policies of the UN and its subsidiary organistations. The 
task of poverty measurement might well be performed by a non-governmental 
agency, rather than by the World Bank whose policies are judged by the trend figures 
it itself produces. And the task of eradicating poverty might be coordinated, better 
than by the UN, by a consortium of willing states (clustered around the EU and 
Canada, perharps). Once such a consortium of states showed genuine commitment 
and take effective steps towards poverty eradication, public pressure to join might 
well mount in other rich states, even in the U.S. But really – and this is the amazing 
thing about global poverty – whereas the problem is so huge that it kills one third of 
all human beings or 18 million each year, the same problem is also so small that it 
can comfortably be solved without the US and without Japan. The rich countries 
currently spend about US$6 billion annually on official development assistance on 
meeting basic needs (“ODA for basic social services”). A serious effort against 
poverty and its associated diseases would cost 20 to 50 times as much (some of this 
in additional aid, but much also in foregone unjust gains the affluent countries now 
derive from unfair trading practices and unjust monopoly rents on their “intellectual 
property” in essential medicines, seeds, and so on). The collective gross national 
incomes (GNIs) of the affluent countries sum to something like $28,000 billion. This 
reduces to roughly half if the US and Japan are taken out. That is still enough to 
underwrite a serious $100 billion or $200 billion poverty eradication campaign. All 
that’s missing is the political will in these countries to raise official development 
assistance on effective poverty eradication alone, unperturbed by the self-interested 
political and commercial interests that currently dominate decisions about ODA 
allocations.” 
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Professor Pogge left Germany to study in Harvard in 1977. His Ph.D. thesis on 
Kant, Rawls and global justice was supervised by John Rawls. Prof. Pogge’s research 
focused at first on the problem of applying the Rawlsian theory of justice to the 
international domain. He came up against two major obstacles: first he was not able 
to convince Rawls of the importance of translating his work from the domestic to the 
global order, and secondly he realized that Rawls’s theory was unworkable even in 
the domestic domain as it ran counter to a number of deeply held moral convictions.  
From then on Pogge worked on developing his own approach to the question of 
global justice, emphasizing the importance of negative duties (duties not to harm) 
over positive duties (duties to aid). He is widely published on the question of global 
justice, but also on Kant, Rawls, and Ethics. For a complete bibliography, see Prof. 
Pogge’s homepage: http://www.columbia.edu/~tp6/index.html 
 
